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Abstract: 
The EU Damages Directive came into force in December 2014. One of its objectives is to 
ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by infringements of competition law can 
effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation in the courts of the EU Member 
States. This paper looks closely at the Directive’s compensation goal and the key 
arrangements that are to encourage victims to seek redress in the national courts. The paper 
uses a simple framework to demonstrate that the legal measures in the Damages Directive 
are unlikely to foster compensation because they fail to create incentives for harmed 
individuals to seek redress. If Member States seek to encourage full compensation, they 
should devise a framework for private antitrust actions that goes beyond the Directive’s 
remit by, for example, allowing class actions. 
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A. Introduction 
 
For many years the European Commission has advocated the use of tort claims to enforce 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the national equivalents. It initiated a discussion about the 
state and role of private antitrust litigation in the EU Member States and how to facilitate 
damages claims at the turn of the millennium. After more than a decade of consultations, 
reports and discussion, the stakeholders agreed on certain measures to regulate and 
harmonise antitrust damages actions.
1
 These measures came into force with the Damages 
Directive in December 2014.
2
 
The Directive pursues two main objectives. The first is to safeguard the effective private 
enforcement of EU competition law by harmonizing the framework for compensation claims 
across the Member States. The rules in the Directive endeavour to ensure that “anyone who 
has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law […] can effectively exercise 
the right to claim full compensation”.
 3
 The Directive obliges Member States to introduce 
certain measures to encourage individuals to seek compensation for harm caused by 
breaches of competition law. The second goal of the Directive is to coordinate public and 
private enforcement – a circumlocution for limits that are imposed on private damages 
actions to protect public law enforcement. Private actions that follow the announcement of 
a public investigation by a competition authority can interfere with that investigation. If, for 
example, a potential claimant seeks access to evidence that is in the hands of the 
competition authority, it may reduce the willingness of firms to cooperate with the 
competition authority if the cooperation would subsequently expose the firm to (greater) 
civil liability in the national courts.
4
 The coordination goal places limits on the goal of 
effective compensation. 
                                                      
1
 For a list of key documents see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html.  
2
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of 
the European Union [2014] OJ L 349/1 (hereinafter “Damages Directive” or “Directive”). 
3
 Article 1(1). 
4
 Recital 25. Buccirossi et al. argue that damages actions do not reduce the attractiveness of leniency 
programmes. Paolo Buccirossi, Marvao, Catarina Moura Pinto and Giancarlo Spagnolo, ‘Leniency and 
Damages’ (2015) Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper Series. 
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In this paper, I am scrutinising the compensation goal of the Directive and whether the 
Directive’s legal measures will make it more likely that victims seek redress from the 
infringer. My analysis will focus on the compensation goal because it epitomises the 
damages actions reform and it has been stressed by all Commissioners involved in the 
making of the Directive. For example, Margrethe Vestager, referring to the Damages 
Directive, announced that “[…] it will be easier for European citizens and companies to 
receive effective compensation for harm caused by antitrust violations”.
5
 For my analysis, I 
propose a simple framework to identify the factors that are likely to incentivise legal action 
and, thus, the factors that are likely to encourage victims to seek redress. I will also identify 
those aspects that are more likely to discourage victims from asking for compensation. 
Based on this framework, I shall look into the potential effects of Damages Directive, asking 
whether it is likely to encourage individuals to seek compensation. I argue that the Damages 
Directive does not encourage more claims. When the Directive provides incentives to 
commence legal action, they are either outweighed by the limitations that are placed on 
private claims or by the costs associated with a more elaborate system of compensation 
claims. If more compensation claims are desired, the Member States ought to introduce 
rules on private antitrust enforcement that go beyond the narrow framework of the 
Damages Directive. 
This study has some caveats. First of all, I will work with a number of contentious 
assumptions that underpin the Damages Directive. For the purpose of this study, I will 
assume that the goal of more effective compensation, i.e. more damages claims, is sound.
6
 I 
doubt that more private claims will help victims of anticompetitive conduct to obtain more 
effective compensation. However, I shall presume that this is true for the purpose of this 
paper which is to assess the rules of the Directive in the light of its compensation goal. I will 
also assume that the proposed measures are based on sound assumptions, in other words, 
that there is a lack of private damages actions and that the non-harmonised national rules 
discourage claimants from seeking damages. With regards to these issues I have pointed to 
                                                      
5
 Press Release of the European Commission, Antitrust: Commission welcomes Council adoption of Directive on 
antitrust damages actions (Brussels, 10 November 2014). 
6
 For a critical view on ‘boosting enforcement’, see Donald I Baker, ‘Revisiting History - What Have We Learned 
About Private Antitrust Enforcement that We Would Recommend to Others’ (2004) 16 Loyola Consumer Law 
Review 379–408. 
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the lack of empirical evidence elsewhere and I will not reiterate my criticism here.
7
 Finally, 
there are limitations as to explanatory power of my observations. I will look at the potential 
effects of isolated rules but this is not a precise science. There are a number of factors that 
are not being accounted for in the stylised framework I am going to use. Furthermore, the 
Member States have two years until December 2016 to implement the Directive into 
national law.
8
 The Damages Directive creates room for interpretation and National 
legislators may read the rules of the Damages differently. Consequently, national rules may 
diverge and so may the incentives provided for in the respective jurisdiction. 
In the next section B, I will briefly outline the background and the content of the Directive to 
illustrate the limitations, goals and scope thereof. Part C develops a simple framework to 
determine the factors that incentivise potential claimants to bring legal actions. This 
framework is then applied to the rules of the Directive in section D. Part E concludes. 
 
B. The Damages Directive 
 
I. Background and objectives 
 
In this part, I will briefly retrace the formation of the Directive, its goals and the rules that 
are to be implemented in the Member States. The Damages Directive has been in the 
making for more than a decade under three different commissioners.
9
 It implements two 
decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that clarified that there is a 
right to compensation for the breach of EU competition law.
10
 
                                                      
7
 Sebastian Peyer, ‘Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany from 2005 to 2007: Empirical Evidence’ (2012) 8 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 331–359. 
8
 Article 21(1). 
9
 Mario Monti (1999-2004), Neelie Kroes (2004-2009), Joaquín Almunia (2010-2014).  
10
 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465 [2001] ECR I-6297; Case C-295/04 
Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461 [2006] ECR I-6619. 
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The European Commission began to explore the options for reforms by consulting 
interested parties on damages-related questions in the Green Paper in 2005,
11
 followed by a 
consultation on the White Paper proposals in 2009.
12
 The Ashurst Report informed the 
Commission in the drafting stages of the Green Paper and provided material about the legal 
situation in the Member States.
13
 It also attempted to provide empirical evidence with 
regards to private damages actions for the infringement of competition law. The White 
Paper of 2009 was flanked by a study on the potential welfare effects of different options 
for reform.
14
 In the course of the consultations, the focus of the damages actions reform 
changed from compensation and deterrence in the Green Paper
15
 towards a more 
compensation-centred perspective in subsequent documents, also excluding group actions 
from the Damages Directive.
16
 The Commission consulted on the quantification of damages 
and published a practical guide for judges.
17
 The quantification guidance does not form part 
of the Directive. Class or group actions were considered separately and the Commission 
issued a recommendation on common principles rather than regulating collective redress in 
the Directive.
18
 
It is crucial to understand the assumptions that underpin the reform process. Most 
stakeholders subscribe to the view that private antitrust enforcement in the EU Member 
States is underdeveloped and that claimants face considerable obstacles when pursuing 
                                                      
11
 Green Paper – Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 final (19 December 
2005). 
12
White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2008) 165 final (2 April 2008). 
13
 Waelbroeck, Denis; Slater, Donald; Even-Shoshan, Gil, Study on the Conditions for the Claims of Damages in 
Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules (Brussels 2004). 
14
 Renda, Andrea, et al, Making Antitrust Damages Actions more Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and 
Potential Scenarios (Brussels 2008). 
15
 The Green Paper also considered group actions. Green Paper (n 11), para 2.5. 
16
 Compensation would also lead to more deterrence, see White Paper (n 12), para 1.2. The Damages Directive 
refers to deterrence only in the context of private enforcement potentially deterring cooperation with the 
competition authorities, see Damages Directive, recital 26. 
17
 Draft Guidance Paper – Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Brussels 2011); European Commission, Communication 
from the Commission on Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C(2013) 3440) (Brussels 2013). 
18
 Commission Staff Working Document – Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress (Brussels 2011); Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for 
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of 
rights granted under Union Law [2013] OJ L201/60. 
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antitrust damages claims in the courts.
19
 According to the European Commission, individuals 
forego compensation in the range of several billion Euros every year.
20
 The failure to obtain 
redress “[…] is largely due to various legal and procedural hurdles in the Member States’ 
rules governing actions for antitrust damages before national courts.”
21
 Two conclusions 
were drawn from these findings. First, the national rules in the Member States ought to be 
harmonised. A more level playing field would help undertakings to operate the internal 
market and aligned rules in the Member States would improve the conditions for consumers 
to exercise the rights they derive from the internal market.
22
 Reducing the divergence of 
legal rules would improve the chances of victims to obtain compensation.
23
 
The second implication of underdeveloped private enforcement is that the number of claims 
ought to be increased to make competition law enforcement more effective. The Damages 
Directive uses terms such as ‘effectively exercising the right to compensation’ or ‘full 
compensation’ but actually avoids reference to expression that suggest an increase in the 
number of cases. Full compensation has two dimensions. It refers to the circumstance that 
improved legal remedies may allow the victim to recover a greater proportion of the loss 
suffered from anticompetitive conduct (or all of it). The White Paper’s Impact Assessment 
clarifies what is meant by the second dimension of effective compensation: “More effective 
antitrust damages actions impl[y] more cases.”
24
 It is not clear whether this refers to legal 
disputes in general, complaints lodged with the courts or to legal proceedings that ended 
with a court decisions. The number of decided cases is certainly lower than the number of 
settled cases but it is easier to measure.
25
 However, settlements are more cost-efficient and 
                                                      
19
 Commission Staff Working Paper - Annex to the Green Paper Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust 
Rules (Brussels 2004), para 29. See also Commission Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment Report: 
Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules (Strassbourg 2013). 
20
 Commission Staff Working Document - Impact Assessment (Brussels 2008), para 45. 
21
 White Paper (n 12), para 1.1. 
22
 Damages Directive, recital 9. 
23
 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission welcomes Council adoption of Directive on antitrust damages 
actions’ (Press release, Brussels, 10 November 2014). 
24
 White Paper Impact Assessment (n 20), para 46; See also European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission 
proposal for Directive to facilitate damages claims by victims of antitrust violations – frequently asked 
questions’ (MEMO/14/310 of 17 April 2014). 
25
 See for the UK experience Barry J Rodger, ‘Why Not Court? A Study of follow-on Actions in the UK’ (2013) 1 
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 104–131. 
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will be preferred by the vast majority of parties over trial and court rulings.
26
 For the 
purpose of this study, I will use a wide interpretation of what is meant by effective 
compensation, assessing the rules of the Directive according to the incentives they provide 
to seek compensation in and outside the courtroom. 
The assumptions that underpin the Directive and the conclusions that were drawn from it 
have decisively shaped the goals of the Directive. The Damages Directive pursues two aims: 
compensation and the coordination of public and private enforcement. Article 1(1) of the 
Directive sets out the first goal of the Directive: strengthening the right to compensation to 
ensure more effective private enforcement actions. This aim reflects the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU that created an EU right to damages in the seminal Courage and Manfredi 
decisions.
27
 According to the Court, every individual ought to be able to claim compensation 
for loss caused by the breach of EU competition rules in the courts of the Member States. 
Flanked by the principle of effectiveness, national rules for damages actions must not 
render the enforcement of the right to compensation impossible or excessively difficult. 
The Directive’s second goal is the coordination of public and private enforcement, Article 
1(2). The European Commission states in its Impact Report that the interaction between 
public and private enforcement has become problematic due to private parties seeking 
access to documents of the competition authorities.
28
 Access requests create ‘legal 
uncertainty and the risk of negative consequences on the public enforcement of EU 
competition law.’
29
 The coordination function addresses concerns regarding the protection 
of confidential files in the hands of the competition authorities.
30
 In the context of the 
Directive, this means implementing safeguards to protect leniency and settlement 
submissions from access. More protection for these documents was deemed necessary 
after the CJEU had designed a case-by-case test for requests seeking access to leniency 
                                                      
26
 The authors of the Georgetown Study on Private Antitrust Enforcement report a settlement rate of 85 per 
cent. Jeffrey M Perloff and Daniel L Rubinfeld, ‘Settlements in Private Antitrust Litigation’ in Lawrence J White 
(ed), Private Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Learning (MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 1988) 149, 163. 
27
 Courage (n 10); Manfredi (n 10). 
28
 Impact Report (n 19). 
29
 Impact Report (n 19), para 34. 
30
 See Recital 6. 
Page 8 of 32 
 
material.
31
 It should be borne in mind that this ‘interaction’ problem occurs in follow-on 
litigation. Follow-on cases are typically brought after a competition authority has adopted 
an infringement decision. The claimants normally intend to rely on information contained in 
the confidential or public version of the decision to benefit from the evidentiary value 
thereof.
32
 
This brief survey of the Directive’s history documents the chequered formation and the 
main goals of the Directive. The conflict between the two main goals is obvious: while the 
Directive is supposed to facilitate compensation it also attempts to safeguard public 
enforcement when there is a risk of conflict between private and public enforcement. The 
tensions between the objectives are reflected in the rules of the Directive which I am going 
to describe in the next section. 
 
II. Outline of the Damages Directive 
 
This subsection provides a short summary of the various rules contained in the Directive. 
This overview is needed to facilitate the assessment in part C. The Directive is mainly going 
to affect three areas of private antitrust litigation: Access to evidence, liability of multiple 
defendants, and the role of indirect purchasers (standing of indirect purchasers and passing-
on defence). 
The Directive facilitates access to evidence via disclosure in those jurisdictions that do not 
allow for the disclosure of documents in civil proceedings. Articles 5 requires the disclosure 
of documents in national proceedings from the opposing party or any third party subject to 
a reasoned request and court control. The national court must use a proportionality test to 
weigh the interests in favour of and against disclosure. The court should consider the 
supporting material that underpins the access request, the scope and cost of disclosure, and 
                                                      
31
 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389 [2011] ECR I-05161; Case C-536/11 
Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, not yet reported. 
32
 My definition of follow-on litigation includes cases that are brought parallel to a public investigation. These 
parallel cases are normally brought because the on-going public investigation has signalled a potential breach 
of competition law.  
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whether the evidence that is to be disclosed contains confidential information.
33
 The 
Directive incorporates the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU, allowing claimants to specify 
categories of documents to facilitate the disclosure procedure.
34
 
Disclosure is restricted for material that is or was in the hands of a competition authority.
35
 
Those requests normally occur in follow-on actions, i.e. damages claims that are initiated 
parallel to or after a public investigation by a competition authority. Requests for access to 
documents held by competition authorities are subject to a much stricter proportionality 
test, Article 6(4). Article 6(6) ‘blacklists’ leniency and settlement submissions. These 
documents enjoy ‘absolute’ protection from disclosure and cannot be revealed to access-
seeking parties at any time. Article 6(5) establishes a temporary blacklist. This closed 
category includes: (i) information that was specifically prepared for the proceedings of a 
competition authority; (ii) information the competition authority has drawn up and sent to 
the parties; and (iii) withdrawn settlement submissions. This material is protected from 
disclosure requests until the competition authority has adopted a decision or otherwise 
terminated the proceedings.  
The second area of reform relates to the liability of multiple defendants, typically a problem 
in cartel cases. Article 11(1) holds co-infringers jointly and severally liable. Any defendant is 
potentially liable for the whole amount of the damage caused by all co-infringing firms to a 
particular claimant. The potential claimant is given a choice to sue one, some, or all 
infringers for the total amount of the loss that he has suffered from a joint infringement. 
The flipside of joint and several liability is that the defendants have to sort out their 
respective shares of the overall harm among themselves. The Directive creates a number of 
exceptions from the rule of joint and several liability. Small- or medium-sized companies are 
liable only for the damage done to their direct and indirect purchasers, Article 11(2). This 
exception applies if the firm has a market share of less than 5 per cent and if “[...] the 
application of the normal rules of joint and several liability would irretrievably jeopardize 
[the small or medium-sized company’s] economic viability and cause its assets to lose all 
                                                      
33
 Article 5(3). 
34
 Donau Chemie (n 31) and Case C‑365/12 P Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:112. The latter case deals with access to documents according to Regulation 1049/2001. 
35
 For a detailed analysis of access to information see Sebastian Peyer, ‘Access to Competition Authorities’ Files 
in Private Antitrust Litigation’ (2015) 3 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 58–86. 
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their value”.
36
 Ringleaders, repeat offenders or firms that have coerced others into 
participating in the illegal conduct cannot benefit from this exception. Joint and several 
liability is further restricted in instances where the defendant has received full immunity 
from fines for cooperating with a competition authority, Article 11(4). The immunity 
recipients will be liable for the harm caused to its direct and indirect purchasers. If claimants 
are not able to receive full compensation from the other co-infringers, they may fall back on 
the immunity recipient. 
Settling defendants will benefit from an exemption of joint and several liability and 
limitations regarding the contribution between joint infringers, Article 19. If the claimant 
settles, his damages claim is reduced by the full amount of the defendants’ share in the 
claimant’s overall loss. It is irrelevant whether or not the claimant received a settlement 
payment covering the full amount of the loss caused by the settling infringer.
37
 This rule can 
be best clarified with an example. Assume that the claimant has suffered a total loss of 
£100. The settling defendant has caused £50 of the claimant’s total harm. The claimant and 
the defendant settle for £25. According to Article 19(1), the remaining claim of the plaintiff 
is reduced by £50 (the share) rather than £25 (the actual settlement reward). In other 
words, the claimant can only recover a residual of £50 from the non-settling infringers. By 
the same token, the settling defendant is protected from further contribution claims. The 
non-settling defendants cannot ask the settling defendant for contribution with regards to 
the remaining claim, Article 19(2). In our example, the settling defendant does not owe 
contribution for any payments the other defendants make towards the claimant’s remaining 
loss of £50. It is apparent that the rule in Article 19 may lead to compensation payments 
that are below the actual loss the claimant has suffered. To address this issue the Damages 
Directive revives the settling defendant’s liability if the claimant is unable to obtain full 
compensation from the non-settling co-infringers. The liability for any remaining and 
uncompensated loss is not renewed when it is expressly excluded in the settlement 
agreement. This is likely to be the default option for settling defendants. 
                                                      
36
 Article 11(2)(b) of the Directive. According to Commission Recommendation of 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 a 
small or medium-sized firm has less than 250 employees and a maximum annual turnover of €50 million. 
37
 Recital 51. 
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The third area of reform in the Directive is the standing for direct and indirect purchasers 
and the related passing-on defence. Article 12 grants both direct and indirect purchasers the 
right to sue for damages. If, for example, wholesalers and retailers have suffered harm from 
an upstream cartel of manufacturers, both have standing to bring a case for the loss they 
have suffered. To help indirect purchasers to prove standing, Article 14(2) creates a 
rebuttable presumption that harm was passed on to indirect purchasers if: (a) the 
defendant has committed an infringement; (b) the infringement resulted in an overcharge 
for the direct purchaser; and (c) the claimant shows that he has purchased affected goods or 
services. The defending company is allowed to invoke the passing-one defence but it bears 
the burden of proof, Article 13. With a passing-on defence, the defendant asserts that the 
direct purchaser did not suffer any loss or loss that is less than the overcharge because the 
direct purchaser was able to transfer it to the indirect purchaser. To facilitate the 
defendant’s burden of proof, the Damages Directive stresses that the defendant may 
request reasonable disclosure from the claimant, Articles 13 and 14(1). 
In addition to these three larger areas of reform, the Directive includes some additional 
measures to facilitate damages actions. Article 9 declares the final infringement decision of 
the EU Commission or a national competition authority binding. The binding effect 
precludes a national court from adopting decisions in private litigation that would run 
counter to the authority’s final decision on which the claimant’s rely. The binding effect is 
limited to national decisions in the respective jurisdiction and decisions of the European 
Commission but foreign decisions are given the status of prima facie evidence, Article 9(2). 
Article 10 sets a minimum limitation period for damages claims of no less than five years 
starting to run from the time the infringement has ceased and the claimant knows or should 
reasonably have known about the infringement. The limitation period applies to both stand-
alone and follow-on actions. However, follow-on actions benefit from a suspension of the 
period of limitations for the duration of the public investigation, Article 10(4). To encourage 
out-of-court settlements, the Directive orders the suspension of the period of limitations for 
the period of consensual dispute resolution, Article 18(1). Courts can estimate the harm 
caused by competition law infringements where the available evidence does not permit a 
precise quantification of damages, Articles 12(5) and 17(1). Article 17(2) creates a 
presumption that a cartel infringement has caused harm. 
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This brief summary of the main rules of the Damages Directive shows that some of the 
pressing issues in antitrust litigation have not been addressed, namely cost rules and claim 
aggregation. The European Commission has recommended that Member States adopt opt-
in class actions but this is not a binding legal measure.
38
 The Directive does not deal with 
claim funding arrangements, the costs of bringing a private action or the costs that are 
associated with proving damages. The question is whether the selective legal measure are 
able to achieve the goal of more effective compensation. In the next section, I will look at 
the factors that influence a claimant’s decision to sue more generally. That section is 
followed by a more in-depth review of the potential effects of the Damages Directive on the 
incentives to seek redress. 
 
C. Analytical framework 
 
The Damages Directive aims at more effective compensation by introducing measures that 
are to increase the willing of victims to seek redress for the breach of competition law.
39
 The 
question is which factors motivate claimants to commence action against a firm that has 
allegedly breached competition law and, subsequently, lead to greater enforcement activity 
and more effective compensation.
40
 Economists have studied the mechanisms of legal 
disputes from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. In this section, I will outline a 
simple framework to analyse the incentives of harmed individuals to engage in settlement 
negotiations and legal disputes. This helps to assess the measures that are included in the 
Damages Directive. It may also prove useful in answering the question as to whether those 
measures are likely to increase the willingness to commence legal action and, consequently, 
are likely to increase the number of antitrust damages claims or the amount of damages 
                                                      
38
 Recommendation (n 18). 
39
 See section B.I. 
40
 An increase in the number of damages claims is a sign for relatively more enforcement actions if we hold the 
number of breaches constant. It is theoretically possible that legal measures lead to an increase in the 
number of violations and, assuming a fixed rate of detection, to more enforcement actions. This would be the 
opposite of what the Directive aims to achieve. Consequently, the number of cases is not a good indicator for 
the effectiveness of private enforcement, Steven C Salop and Lawrence J White, ‘Economic Analysis of Private 
Antitrust Litigation’ (1986) 74 Georgetown Law Journal 1001–1064. 
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received.
41
 Since the Directive focuses on compensation, I will not consider models that look 
at optimal deterrence. The insights gained in this part of the paper will be applied to the 
rules of the Directive in section D. 
The rational claimant’s decision to initiate legal actions will normally be based on a cost-
benefit analysis.
42
 A prospective claimant will sue if he is to expect a positive payoff, 
typically a monetary award.
43
 In the context of competition damages litigation, it means 
that the claimant is more likely to sue if he expects to obtain a damages or a settlement 
payment that outweighs the costs of initiating legal action. The decision of the claimant can 
be formalised, using a simple model proposed by Renda et al.
44
 This model will help to 
assess the legal rules of the Directive in the next section.
45
 
Assume that an individual suffers a loss from the breach of competition law. Any legal 
response to obtain compensation is costly. The harmed individual would need to pay, for 
example, solicitors, court fees and expert witnesses. These costs can be divided into the 
costs for negotiating a settlement (Cs) the costs for trial that are recoverable under the loser 
pays rule (Ct) and the costs for trial expenses that are not recoverable (Cf).
46
 Cs and Cf 
include opportunity costs, for example, the cost of the time that is devoted to the dispute 
                                                      
41
 For an overview about factors influencing litigation, see Morten Hviid and John Peysner, ‘Comparing 
Economic Incentives across EU Member States’ in Barry J Rodger (ed), Competition Law: Comparative Private 
Enforcement and Collective Redress across the EU (Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2014) 195. 
42
 William M Landes, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’ (1971) 14 Journal of Law & Economics 61–107; 
Richard A Posner, ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’ (1973) 2 Journal of 
Legal Studies 399–458; Steven Shavell, ‘Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative 
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs’ (1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 55–82. 
43
 Ilya Segal and Michael Whinston, ‘Public vs Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey’ (2007) 28 
European Competition Law Review 306–315, 311. 
44
 See Renda (n 14), 175. 
45
 The basic model was developed and refined by Landes (n 42); Posner (n 42); John P Gould, ‘The Economics of 
Legal Conflicts’ (1973) 2 Journal of Legal Studies 279–300; Lucian A Bebchuk, ‘Litigation and Settlement 
Under Imperfect Information’ (1984) 15 RAND Journal of Economics 404–415. See also Robert D Cooter and 
Daniel L Rubinfeld, ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’ (1989) 27 Journal of Economic 
Literature 1067–1097. For models with a focus on antitrust litigation see Perloff and Rubinfeld (n 26); George 
J Benston, ‘A Comprehensive Analysis of the Determinants of Private Antitrust Litigation, with Particular 
Emphasis on Class Action Suits and the Rule of Joint and Several Damages’ in Lawrence J White (ed), Private 
Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Learning (MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 1988) 271; Sylvain Bourjade, 
Patrick Rey and Paul Seabright, ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-trial Bargaining’ (2009) 
57 Journal of Industrial Economics 372–409. 
46
 In the English system only reasonable or proportionate costs are recoverable. 
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rather than to something else. Any party initiating steps to obtain monetary redress expects 
a reward, typically a monetary payment from either settlement (S) or trial (D). The dispute 
will settle with probability (p). If the case does not settle with probability (1-p), the claimant 
has a probability of winning (w) at trial. An injured party will initiate legal proceedings if the 
expected value from settlement and litigation is greater than zero:
47
  
 
[Insert equation (1) here] 
 
It is important to note that the individual’s decision depends on the perception of the 
probability to obtain a settlement (p), the probability to win at trial (w), the reward after 
trial (D), the reward after settlement (S) and legal cost (Cs, Ct and Cf). In the real world, the 
potential claimant does not know how long settlement negotiations are going to last or 
what the final settlement payoff is going to be. This uncertainty is likely to lead to errors 
regarding the estimation of these factors. If the parties have very different expectations 
about the potential outcome of the legal dispute, their threat values are unlikely to meet, 
preventing successful pre-trial bargaining. The claimant may be overly optimistic as to the 
probability of winning at trial or he overestimates the potential reward from litigation. He 
may overestimate the value of litigation and settlement and, thus, reduce the chances that 
the defendant’s offer meets his expectations.
48
 The idea underpinning the model is that 
private claimants aim to maximise profits; i.e. the perceived gains from legal action provide 
the incentives for victims to enforce the law. 
As I have outlined above, it is important to look at the incentives to settle a dispute in order 
to assess whether a legal framework such as the Damages Directive will lead to more 
effective compensation.
49
 The costs of settlement (Cs) are expected to be lower than the 
costs of going to court (Ct and Cf). The reward from settlement (S) is presumed to be smaller 
than the reward from litigation (D). Although settlement payments are usually lower than 
the harm that has actually accrued, rational parties will settle as it reduces litigation cost 
                                                      
47
 I am indebted to Morten Hviid and Cosmo Graham for their helpful suggestions. 
48
 Cooter and Rubinfeld (n 45).  
49
 See section B.I. above. 
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and removes the uncertainty of court proceedings.
50
 Empirical evidence suggests that only a 
small fraction of disputes is actually decided by a judge or reaches the trial stage.
51
 Thus, the 
question is whether a given rule change affects the bargaining position of the parties at the 
settlement stage as well as their position when arguing the case in the courtroom.
52
 Ideally, 
legal rules reduce the divergence between the parties’ perception to win and, thus, 
encourage settlement by, for example, improving access to information.
53
 
It is difficult to predict exactly how the change of a single rule will affect the incentives of 
claimants or how it will operate in a given legal system.
54
 However, some general 
observations can be made. Rules that reduce the costs of the claimant (C, including Cs, Ct 
and Cf), encourage injured parties to use judicial tools to resolve their disputes.
55
 Similarly, a 
higher potential reward, i.e. increasing D or S, will induce the injured party to commence 
legal proceedings. Cost efficiencies could be realised by making evidence more easily 
available or by allowing for the aggregation of multiple individual claims. The injured 
individual is “[…] more likely to sue when his perceived probability of success is greater, 
when his litigation costs are lower, and when his rewards from success are greater.”
56
 Legal 
measures and policies are likely to influence the decision to seek redress because the can 
either reduce or increase the perceived value of probability of success, expected rewards 
and expected costs. In the following section, I will look at the rules of the Directive in an 
attempt to determine whether those rules are likely to contribute to effective compensation 
by providing incentives for injured parties to seek redress.  
 
                                                      
50
 ibid.; Jeffrey M Perloff, Daniel L Rubinfeld and Paul Ruud, ‘Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes’ (1996) 
78 The Review of Economics and Statistics 401–409; Perloff, Rubinfeld and Ruud (n 50). 
51
 Perloff and Rubinfeld (n 26). report that 85 per cent of antitrust cases in their sample settled. See also 
George L Priest and Benjamin Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’ (1984) 13 Journal of Legal 
Studies 1–55. 
52
 Gary M Fournier and Thomas W Zuehlke, ‘Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach’ (1989) 71 The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 189–195. 
53
 See section D.I. below. 
54
 Avery W Katz, ‘Indemnity of Legal Fees’ in Gerrit d Geest and Boudewijn Bouckaert (eds), Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economics: Volume I - The History and Methodology of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham 2000) 63. 
55
 Bourjade, Rey and Seabright (n 45). 
56
 Salop and White (n 40), 1019. 
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D. Incentives to seek compensation and the Damages Directive 
 
In the previous section, I outlined a simple model of the settlement and litigation process. It 
helped to clarify that the willingness to seek redress depends on the expected probability to 
settle or win in court (p and w), the expected size of the reward after settlement (S) or trial 
(D), and the expected costs (C). In this section, I will look at how the rules in the Directive 
potentially affect the incentives to initiate legal action. 
 
I. Access to evidence 
 
The Directive introduces disclosure to facilitate access to evidence in competition damages 
cases in many Member States.
57
 Disclosure forces the other party in a legal dispute to reveal 
information. It addresses two problems: It remedies information asymmetries between the 
parties when, for example, the infringer has better information about the actual harm 
caused to the victim.
58
 Information revelation can also decrease uncertainty as to the 
expected probability to win or the expected payoff from legal action. It will usually improve 
the quality of the information held by both parties, helping the parties to better estimate 
the value of the reward from settlement (S) or litigation (D). Especially in follow-on cases, 
where information is already available, the disclosure of documents may not always have a 
positive or negative influence on the probability to win, but it reduces the error with which 
the probability is estimated. This is important for settlement negotiations. Parties settle if 
they receive a surplus from settling compared to the non-cooperative (trial) strategy.
59
 But 
settlement will only occur if the expectations are aligned, i.e. one party’s threat value is met 
by the other party’s settlement offer.
60
 With better access to information the threat values 
                                                      
57
 Some EU jurisdictions, notably the UK, have mandatory disclosure regimes. 
58
 Bruce L Hay, ‘Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope’ (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 481–515. 
59
 Robert B Cooter, Law and Economics (6th ed. Pearson, Boston 2014), 60. 
60
 The threat value is the claimant’s minimum value for which he would be willing to settle or the maximum 
value for which the defendant would accept a settlement. The claimant’s expected gain from trial is 
represented by  − 1 − 	 − 
 where wp is the claimant’s probability to win. The defendant’s 
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are likely to become more realistic and, thus, the likelihood of settlement and compensation 
payments increases.  
As for the problem of information asymmetry, it is claimed that incriminating evidence is 
frequently in the hand of the defendant who, without mandatory disclosure, is unlikely to 
reveal harmful information.
61
 Any party to a dispute is normally willing to voluntarily 
disclose information that has a negative value to its opponent because such information 
reduces the other side’s expected award (S or D) or the probability to win (w).
62
 If, for 
example, the defendant has information showing that the claimant has no case or lost less 
than averred, the defendant will reveal the material to reduce the claimant’s expected 
damages award and chances of winning. At the same time, parties to a legal dispute are 
more likely to withhold information when it may prove harmful to their own case. 
Mandatory disclosure, as arranged for in the Directive, overcomes the problem of 
information being withheld. It is particularly useful in antitrust disputes where a defending 
monopolist or cartel member is likely to have better information about the infringement 
and the overcharge.  
By allowing disclosure the drafters of the Damages Directive hope to incentivise victims to 
file more damages claims in the courts and to improve the probability that victims receive 
full compensation.
63
 Better information improves the accuracy of judges’ decision making 
and facilitates the calculation of the actual loss. Whether or not disclosure increases the 
number of court decisions depends on the information parties are likely to obtain from their 
respective opponents and whether parties have been relatively optimistic or pessimistic 
regarding their chances of success. A relatively optimistic claimant has relatively greater 
expectations of winning, i.e. he is likely to overestimate the expected value from bringing a 
damages claim. If the defendant has an equally optimistic expectation of successfully 
defending against that claim, the parties are less likely to settle. If both parties are relatively 
pessimistic about their chances to win, i.e. the claimant values his chances of winning as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
threat value (expected loss) is  − +  + 1 −  −  with wd being the defendant’s probability to 
successfully defend. The latter expression represents the maximum the defendant would be willing to offer 
to the claimant. 
61
 Recital 14. 
62
 Cooter and Rubinfeld (n 45). 
63
 Recital 15. 
Page 18 of 32 
 
being relatively low and the defendant rates his chances of successfully defending against 
the claim as low too, a settled outcome is more realistic.
64
 Mandatory disclosure can either 
increase or decrease optimism, depending on the evidence that is being found. Thus, theory 
is unable to predict whether or not more cases will be decided by the courts.
65
 It is more 
likely that disclosure will reveal incriminating evidence in follow-on cases where an 
infringement has already been established by the competition authority. More generally, 
altering the rules on evidence, including disclosure, affects the probability that a claimant 
will win at trial.
66
 This, in turn, can affect the probability with which parties settle their 
disputes.
67
 
The disclosure rules in the Directive possibly encourage victims to seek compensation from 
the wrongdoer, especially in follow-on cases in which the claimants rely on a decision of the 
competition authorities. In those cases victims can be certain that the defendant possesses 
incriminating material. Better access to information can improve the claimant’s valuation of 
the chances to succeed (w) and the valuation of the actual loss (S or D). The rules on 
disclosure are likely to have a positive effect on the incentives to bring a claim in those 
jurisdictions where disclosure does not exist.
68
 The threat of disclosure is also more likely to 
lead to an increased settlement rate which helps to save resources, provided that none of 
the parties is relatively optimistic. The question is whether these potential benefits are 
outweighed by the costs of disclosure.
69
 
Disclosure raises questions as to the scope of disclosure, i.e. how much and what kind of 
information should be revealed.
70
 This question is closely related to the costs of information 
revelation which, as the US experience shows, are substantial.
71
 The more documents are to 
be disclosed, the greater the costs of providing and analysing the information. The Directive 
                                                      
64
 Perloff, Rubinfeld and Ruud (n 50). 
65
 Cooter and Rubinfeld (n 45); Robert D Cooter and Daniel L Rubinfeld, ‘An Economic Model of Legal 
Discovery’ (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 435, 448. 
66
 Perloff, Rubinfeld and Ruud (n 50). 
67
 Henry S Farber and Michelle J White, ‘Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation 
Process’ (1991) 22 RAND Journal of Economics 199. 
68
 The effects in England and Wales, where disclosure already exists, may be different. 
69
 For the potential abuse of disclosure see Cooter and Rubinfeld (n 65). 
70
 Hay (n 58). 
71
 Scott A Moss, ‘Litigation Discovery Cannot be Optimal but Could be Better: the Economics of Improving 
Discovery Timing in a Digital Age’ (2009) 58 Duke Law Journal 889. 
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tries to strike a balance between achieving better access to information and cost savings, 
suggesting a proportionality test that balances benefits and costs. This is a more general 
attempt to keep the costs of disclosure at bay. However, the Damages Directive does not 
regulate which party bears the financial burden of disclosure. The financial burden of 
disclosure is a crucial issue because depending on who pays those expenses it can 
encourage legal action and settlements. 
It has been pointed out that the cost rules regarding discovery may lead to asymmetric cost 
distribution and, thus, influence bargaining and settlement.
72
 In other words, the threat of 
the costs associated with disclosure could encourage the innocent defendant to settle prior 
to the exchange of information in order to avoid these costs. An active judicial control of 
disclosure and costs may reduce the risk that the defendant is ‘blackmailed’ into a 
settlement. For example, parties in the English courts are only obliged to conduct a 
‘reasonable search’ for documents when giving standard disclosure, allowing them to limit 
the categories of documents that are being searched.
73
 Similarly, the prospect of cost 
management and cost capping may reduce the influence of potential disclosure costs on the 
innocent defendant’s decision.
74
  
Even with measures to control costs in place, the question of who is going to bear the costs 
of disclosure has a considerable effect on the incentives to commence legal action.
75
 If 
disclosure expenses fall under potentially recoverable legal costs like, for example, in 
England and Wales, the losing party may have to pay some or all of the costs incurred as 
part of the reasonable costs.
76
 Applying the English rule to the model above, the costs of 
disclosure would fall under Ct and the non-recoverable portion under Cf. Thus, the greater 
the non-recoverable part of the costs, the lower will be the expected award from litigation. 
                                                      
72
 Perloff, Rubinfeld and Ruud (n 50); Frank H Easterbrook, ‘Discovery as Abuse’ (1989) 69 Boston University 
Law Review 635–648. 
73
 Civil Procedure Rules 31.7(1)-(3). 
74
 See, for example, the first cost-capping decision of the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal in Socrates 
Training Limited v The Law Society of England and Wales [2016] CAT 10. The court may also disallow all or 
part of the costs, Civil Procedure Rules 44.11. 
75
 William H Wagener, ‘Modeling the Effect of One-way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust 
Litigation’ (2003) 78 New York University Law Review 1887–1928. 
76
 Civil Procedure Rules 44.1 to 44.5. The principle of reasonableness/proportionality can severely limit the 
recoverable costs, see, for example, Tesco Plc v Competition Commission [2009] CAT 26 (applying rule 55 of 
the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003). 
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This, in turn, reduces the expected award from settlement negotiations. Unless the 
claimant’s subjective expectation of winning is high, this may reduce the incentives to seek 
compensation. 
Member States could also adopt a rule according to which each party bears its own costs of 
disclosure, similarly to the cost rules in the United States. Such a rule would potentially 
provide more incentives to sue as it lowers the costs of legal action for a claimant that 
possesses little valuable information like, for example, a consumer in a cartel case. The costs 
of disclosure for such a claimant would consequently be relatively low. It is surprising that 
the costs of disclosure are not regulated in the Damages Directive, given that disclosure 
costs exert a considerable impact on the incentives to sue. Member States are free to 
choose whether disclosure costs are born by the disclosing party, or fully or partly 
recoverable by the winning party. National disclosure rules may offer varying incentives for 
claimants and, thus, Member States may use cost rules to attract or discourage legal actions 
in their respective jurisdiction. 
 
II. Joint and several liability 
 
Joint and several liability and the rules governing contribution also have an effect on the 
willingness of defendants to settle and, thus, on the compensation that is potentially paid to 
victims of anticompetitive conduct.
77
 
In a system of joint and several liability, the claimant can choose whether to sue one, some 
or all of the defendants if the infringement was committed jointly. This choice increases the 
chance that the claimant will fully recover his loss if one of the tortfeasors is unable to pay 
damages or part thereof. Many EU jurisdictions provide for joint and several liability. The 
general rule is that one infringer is liable for the entire harm caused by all tortfeasors but 
national rules may allocate the harm differently based, for example, on the degree of 
                                                      
77
 For a detailed discussion of different contribution rules see Timothy J Stanley, ‘An Analysis of the Rules of 
Contribution and no Contribution for Joint and Several Liability in Conspiracy Cases’ (1994) 35 Santa Clara 
Law Review 1–122. 
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culpability.
78
 The rules of the Directive change three aspects: First, they remove small and 
medium-sized firms from the pool of jointly liable defendants if certain criteria are 
satisfied.
79
 Second, they create uncertainty as to the liability of the immunity recipient and 
they obfuscate the incentives of firms to settle disputes. Thirdly, they limit the overall 
amount of compensation that can be obtained from jointly and severally liable defendants if 
the claimant settles with one of them. 
Most economic models of joint and several liability look at the effects on the defendants’ 
incentives to settle rather than on the claimants’ incentives to sue.
80
 A higher proportion of 
settled disputes reduces litigation costs but it does not answer the question which rule – 
proportionate or joint and several liability – provides greater incentives to seek 
compensation. The predictions as to the effects of joint and several liability and the 
contribution rules differ. Some economists find that claimants are able to extract more 
damages in a system of joint and several liability but that such a system leads to a lower rate 
of settlements.
81
 Others demonstrate that joint and several liability leads to higher levels of 
aggregate damages and that more information is revealed to the private plaintiff if there is 
no contribution between the defendants.
82
 In the simple litigation model I outlined above, a 
higher damages award would increase the expected value from litigation (D) or settlement 
(S) and encourage victims to commence legal action. If a joint and severally liable defendant 
settles early and provides information to the claimant, this may increase the probability of 
winning (w) or successfully settling (p) subsequent disputes against the remaining infringers. 
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The potential effects of the Damages Directive’s rules of joint and several liability on the 
incentives to sue are ambiguous. The complicated system of exemptions in the Directive 
makes it difficult to predict whether injured parties will be encouraged to seek redress. 
Complex legal rules may have benefits,
83
 but they are likely to raise expected litigation costs. 
Potential claimants are unlikely to know at the outset whether the exemption for small and 
medium-sized companies applies to the defendant. This has to be established in court; it 
normally requires more evidence and creates uncertainty as to the outcome of the trial. The 
exemptions also increase uncertainty as to reward the claimant can expected after all 
proceedings have been closed. It is possible that reducing the number of liable co-
defendants via exemptions reduces the expected reward from damages litigation or 
increases the risks and potential length of the proceedings.  
The arrangements for settling defendants are particularly puzzling and may create 
unintended incentives on part of the claimant. According to Article 19(1) of the Directive, 
settlements will reduce the claimants’ remaining claim against other infringers by the whole 
share of harm that the settling defendant has caused to the claimant.
84
 In our example from 
above, the claimant settled for 25 although the settling infringers share was 50. The overall 
claim was 100 but is reduced by the share of 50 and not by the actual amount paid.
85
 This 
would give a claimant an incentive to obtain settlements from those infringers that have not 
caused direct harm to him but are jointly and severally liable. Settling with infringers from 
which the claimant did not purchase would reduce the claim only by the settled amount 
rather than the settling defendant’s share because the latter is zero in the absence of direct 
dealings. Alternatively, one could argue that the claim is not reduced at all when settling 
with a jointly and severally liable infringer that did not have direct dealings with the 
claimant. Article 19(1) reduces the settling injured party’s claim by the share of the harm 
inflicted upon the injured party which, in this instance, would be zero. This must be a 
mistake as it could potentially lead to overcompensation, something the drafters of the 
Directive sought to exclude with Article 3(3). 
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 Louis Kaplow, ‘A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules’ (1995) 11 Journal of Law, Economics, & 
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While the claimant may have an incentive to pursue settlement negotiations with the 
defendants that have not directly harmed him, it is questionable whether those ‘non-direct’ 
defendants have an incentive to settle. The infringer that did not have direct dealings with 
the claimant has an incentive to hold out until the claimant has settled with other infringers. 
Those settlements would potentially reduce the remaining claim to zero even though the 
claimant has not received full compensation. Because there is a risk that the claimant would 
forego full compensation, he has no incentive to settle first with a defendant that has 
caused direct harm to him if this would result in a settlement award that is lower than the 
harm caused by this particular defendant. Such a settlement would reduce this part of the 
claim to zero even if the settlement amount covers only a fraction of the harm that was 
caused by the settling infringer. The claimant cannot recover the difference between actual 
harm and settlement from the other co-infringers. Only if we assume that there are non-
recoverable costs (Cf) on part of the non-direct defendant, it seems plausible for this 
defendant to settle if he was still better off compared to litigation or holding-up. To fully 
understand the complex dynamics of these exemption rules, further modelling is required. It 
appears though that the Directive does not align the incentives of claimants and defendants 
to settle. Thus, the settlement rules are likely to discourage settlements and encourage 
costly litigation. This may deter some claimants from asking for compensation in the first 
place. 
In addition to the complex settlement rules, the exemption rule for the immunity recipient 
temporarily removes a potential defendant from the pool of joint defendants. This rules is 
to protect the immunity recipient from becoming a preferred target for civil claims.
86
 
Inadvertently, the Directive may have just achieved the opposite. To avoid uncertainty as to 
the outcome of any other legal disputes – the immunity recipient would have to wait until 
the end of all other civil proceedings – he is likely to settle first, benefitting from the 
exclusion from any further liability under the settlement rules. The willingness of the 
immunity recipient to settle early could encourage injured parties to approach him in the 
first place and, thus, provide easier access to compensation. 
                                                      
86
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The incentives for claimants to bring cases against small and medium-sized enterprises as 
well as immunity recipient may be undermined by the unclear scope of the exemptions. The 
Directive reduces the liability of the immunity recipient and small companies to ‘its own 
direct and indirect purchasers’.
87
 The Directive does not define whether this includes harm 
the claimant has incurred from other defendants. Assume the potential claimant purchases 
affected products from several defendants. In this scenario two interpretations are possible: 
The victim has obtained the right to sue the immunity recipient for the whole loss caused by 
all defendants as long as he has bought one affected product from the immunity recipient. 
According to this interpretation, the claimant would be able to sue the immunity recipient 
for the entire cartel-related loss, including loss caused by other co-infringers. Only those 
who have not purchased products from the immunity recipient are barred from suing the 
immunity recipient in the first place. Alternatively, one could forward a narrower 
interpretation of the exemption that limits damages claims against the immunity recipient 
to the exact loss the immunity recipient has caused to its direct and indirect purchasers. 
Whichever interpretation Member States are going to prefer, it will reduce certainty with 
regards to the damages award and the probability to win. 
To encourage parties to seek compensation, contribution should be based on one simple 
and comprehensive formula.
88
 The joint and several liability arrangements in the EU’s 
antitrust damages framework are the opposite of simple. The recourse option against 
settling defendants is mere window dressing as no settling defendant would leave that 
option to a settling claimant.
89
 The suggested framework is complex and the standard rule is 
riddled with exceptions that are questionable in their scope and effect. The effects on the 
incentives to seek compensation are ambiguous at best. 
 
III. Indirect purchaser standing and passing-on defence 
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To facilitate compensation the Damages Directive grants standing to bring damages actions 
to indirect purchasers.
90
 It is argued that the expansion of standing to include indirect 
purchasers incorporates the Courage and Manfredi jurisprudence of the CJEU.
91
 The flipside 
of acknowledging that some or all of the harm has been passed on to the next level in the 
distribution chains is recognising the passing-on defence. The defendant can invoke the 
passing-on defence against a damages claim, asserting that the claimant has passed through 
some or all of the overcharge to the next level in the distribution chain. The question is how 
the new rules on standing for indirect purchasers and the availability of the passing-on 
defence affect the incentives to commence legal action, i.e. the claimant’s subjective 
expectation regarding the award from legal action (D and S) , the probability to win (p and 
w) and the associated costs (C). 
The passing-on defence is likely to have a negative effect on the incentives of direct 
purchasers to bring legal actions. If the defendant can show that the claimant has shifted 
some or all of the overcharge to the next level in the distribution chain, the damages award 
of the direct purchaser is reduced by the amount that has been passed on. This has two 
consequences. First, it means that the expected reward from litigation or settlement (D or S) 
is likely to be lower compared to a framework without passing-on.
92
 That, in turn, reduces 
the incentives to sue. Second, legal costs are likely to increase. Establishing the exact 
amount that has been passed through to the next level is complex, adding to the costs of 
negotiation or litigation while, at the same, increasing the uncertainty as to the final reward 
from legal action.
93
 The quantification of the passed on overcharge requires a full analysis of 
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the affected markets and depends, inter alia, on the price elasticity in the downstream 
market.
94
 
The Directive allows indirect purchasers to bring damages actions against infringers that are 
further up the distribution chain. The typical indirect purchaser suffers a small individual 
loss and is often the final purchaser of the affected product; but indirect purchasers may 
also operate on the wholesale level.
95
 Indirect purchasers are remote from the actual 
infringement and possess little information about the nature and extent of the harm; this 
means that they have greater costs of searching and obtaining information.
96
 Many indirect 
purchasers are consumers who are disinclined to take large corporations to court. The 
available empirical evidence shows that indirect purchaser actions are a rather rare.
97
 For 
most indirect purchasers, the relatively low individual losses and, thus, potential reward (D 
or S) compare unfavourably to the potential costs of legal actions. Consequently, the 
expected value of legal action is likely to be negative and will discourage indirect purchasers 
from seeking damages.
98
 
The drafters of the Directive take into account that indirect purchasers will find it difficult to 
obtain sufficient evidence for their claims. The rebuttable presumption that harm was 
passed on to indirect purchasers, Article 14(2), is meant to facilitate the proof of standing. It 
certainly helps the claimant to show that he is qualified to bring a claim but it does not 
alleviate the burden on the indirect purchaser to show exactly how much of the overcharge 
was passed on to him. Indirect purchasers can ask for reasonable disclosure of documents 
from the defendant or third parties but this will add to the overall legal costs (Ct and Cf). A 
meaningful way to address the issue of small losses and high legal costs is to arrange for an 
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aggregation of individual claims. The Commission has recommended an opt-in class action 
model but has not made this proposal binding.
99
 Even if all Member States introduced 
mechanisms to aggregate small individual losses from indirect purchasers, it is argued that 
the high costs of class actions outweigh the benefits thereof. If individuals with an indirect 
relationship with the infringer are given the right to compensation, they are likely to secure 
only small amounts of compensation.
100
 
The evidence suggests that indirect purchasers do not have strong incentives to enforce the 
antitrust laws. Some commentators suggest that it is probably best to bar indirect 
purchasers from bringing cases in the interest of effective enforcement.
101
 Others assert 
that standing to both direct and indirect purchasers approximates compensation to the real 
harm.
102
 For the purpose of my analysis it is important to note that both indirect purchaser 
standing and the passing-on defence produce ambiguous effect on the incentives to seek 
compensation. Neither rule clearly encourages a group of claimants to ask for 
compensation. With regards to the simple litigation model, it is likely that the Directive’s 
rules on indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence do not increase the 
expected reward (S and D) but are likely to increase the cost of legal action (C). 
 
IV. Other rules 
 
To complete the analysis of the compensation objective in the Damages Directive, I will look 
at the remaining, probably less intrusive and least contentious rules. The Damages Directive 
makes decisions of the European Commission and the national competition authority 
binding in subsequent private proceedings.
103
 The statute of limitations is extended and the 
period of limitation stayed for violations that are investigated by a competition authority. 
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Judges are given the powers to estimate harm. I do not doubt that these rules may be useful 
but none of them will provide key incentives for injured individuals to seek redress. 
The binding effect releases parties in follow-on disputes from proving the actual 
infringement. This reduces the cost of litigation (Ct and Cf) and increases the expected 
probability of winning in follow-on cases (w and p). The available evidence suggests that 
antitrust damages actions are more often than not follow-on cases, in other words, they are 
typically brought after the competition authority has unearthed potential evidence about 
wrongdoing or launched an investigation.
104
 Many jurisdiction have a binding effect or 
accept decisions of the competition authority as prima facie evidence, thus, the binding 
effect will not trigger a surge of new cases. Follow-on cases also depend on public 
investigations which are limited in numbers and, in recent years, tend to settle rather than 
being concluded with an infringement decision. Arguably, the follow-on rule improves legal 
certainty and helps parties to better estimate their chances of success. However, the 
Directive does not exactly define which elements of a public decision constitute the binding 
part. This may lead to uncertainty and, consequently, increase the potential cost of 
litigation, at least until this has been clarified by the courts.
105
 More importantly though is 
the fact that the quantification of harm proves to be the most expensive and time-
consuming aspect of follow-on damages claims. The binding effect does not facilitate this 
facet of litigation. 
The new period of limitations for antitrust damages actions provides a minimum period of 
five years. If the national period of limitation for tort claims was shorter, the new rules gives 
claimants more time to bring a legal action. This rule has probably a negligible effect on the 
probability to win or settle or on the size of the reward from litigation. 
Judges are empowered to estimate the amount of overcharge and passing-on. This is an 
interesting rule but, in its current shape, leaves much to be desired from a compensation 
point of view. It is unlikely to encourage claimants to bring legal actions. The Directive 
allows the estimation of harm in cases where it is ‘practically impossible’ or ‘excessively 
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difficult’ to ‘precisely quantify the harm’. This is a rather high burden. It means that the 
claimant will still have to provide evidence unless he can show that he has exhausted all 
possible means to prove the damages – a difficult undertaking given the existence of 
disclosure. Just because quantification is costly does not release the claimant from this 
burden. Even if the judge estimates the harm, a reference point for the estimation is needed 
and the judge has to rely on some kind of evidence. I doubt that this rule is going to lower 
the claimant’s burden of proof. Neither does this rule increase the reward from legal action 
(D), nor does it reduce the expected costs (C). 
 
E. Conclusions 
 
When the Damages Directive passed the Council of the European Union, it was harshly 
criticised by the Polish, Slovenian, and German delegations for failing its very own 
objectives.
106
 In this paper, I have demonstrated that this is certainly true for the Directive’s 
compensation goal. Some arrangements in the Damages Directive may encourage victims to 
seek redress, for example, the rules regulating access to evidence may improve the 
probability to settle or win a damages award. They could also increase the potential award 
but they come at a cost that may well outweigh the benefits, especially since most EU 
jurisdictions feature a loser-pays principle. Most arrangements in the Directive do not 
contribute much to the compensation objective. The rules regarding joint and several 
liability do not encourage victims to seek compensation. The Directive’s impetus on indirect 
purchaser standing and passing-on increases the costs of legal action while reducing the 
expected reward. Overall, the Damages Directive has a negligible impact on individuals’ to 
seek redress in the courts, especially when the claimant is an individual consumer or does 
not have deep pockets to finance litigation. The Directive does not address some of the 
important aspects of antitrust litigation: legal costs, cost shifting and claim aggregation. It 
may well be that the Directive has an indirect influence on private antitrust litigation by, for 
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example, changing the way infringement findings are communicated but this remains to be 
seen. 
The Directive states that full compensation is achieved if the position of an injured individual 
is restored as if the infringement had not taken place. The Member States must ensure that 
a successful compensation claim includes redress for actual loss, loss of profits and the 
payment of interest.
107
 Given that the Directive does not encourage victims to seek 
compensation, it is for the Member States to put individuals in a better position to sue. This 
means addressing the cost issues and the problem of claim aggregation, provided the 
Member States agree with the underpinning assumption that more private actions mean 
more effective enforcement of the competition rules. Many Member States still struggle 
with the concept of opt-out class actions and this has opened up opportunities for Member 
States to compete for claims. The UK’s new opt-out class action regime has yet to be tested 
but it appears to be a viable option to address the cost-benefit issues of victims with small 
individual losses.
108
 Redress schemes – such as, for example, those introduced in the UK – 
could also be a solution to promote the compensation of victims.
109
 With regards to 
compensation for consumers, the courts and legislators in many Member States are already 
ahead of the Directive, introducing, for example, class actions.
110
  
One could argue that the Directive is not about compensation anyway but about the 
protection of public enforcement in general, and leniency programmes in particular. 
Competition authorities assert that the release of leniency documents would undermine the 
incentives to blow the whistle. Cooperating firms would fear the exposure to civil claims and 
refrain from revealing crucial information to the competition authorities. This would mean 
fewer investigations and less deterrence. It would also mean fewer follow-on actions for 
damages. Some two thirds of cartel infringements in Europe are currently uncovered as a 
result of leniency, although there are some questions as to how many of those represent 
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active and successful cartels.
111
 With regards to this second objective it is not clear that the 
Directive will lead to a better protection of public enforcement either. Immunity recipients 
and undertakings that settle with the competition authorities receive preferential treatment 
but, as I have shown above, the rules regarding joint and several liability produce ambiguous 
effects. Only time will show whether these rules do provide a benefit to cooperating 
companies. The restrictions regarding disclosure of leniency documents may help to protect 
leniency programmes but it remains to be seen whether this rule complies with EU law. The 
CJEU has emphasised that an absolute protection of leniency documents violates the right 
to compensation of access-seeking parties.
112
 The Court preferred a case-by-case approach 
to assess access requests. In contrast to the CJEU’s position, the Damages Directive does not 
permit a weighing test for leniency documents and this may become the subject of a future 
preliminary reference. 
With the Damages Directive being in force, the question is how the Member States are 
going to deal with it. Since the Directive does not address the most important claim-related 
issues, namely cost issues and claim aggregation, the Member States are free to experiment 
with either low-cost litigation systems or expensive class action frameworks that increase 
the potential reward from litigation. Either way, if more compensation is desired, the 
national legislators have to bear in mind that just implementing the Directive is unlikely to 
incentivise more victims to seek redress from firms that breached the competition rules. If 
private enforcement is to become a strong second pillar of competition law enforcement - 
and some Member States show that it can complement public enforcement
113
 – national 
governments must regulate private antitrust enforcement beyond the narrow scope of the 
Antitrust Damages Directive. 
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Appendix 
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